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Abstract
The novel H1N1 influenza virus that emerged in humans in Mexico in early 2009 and transmitted efficiently 
in the human population with global spread was declared a pandemic strain. The introduction of different 
avian and human influenza virus genes into swine influenza viruses often result in viruses of increased 
fitness for pigs that occasionally transmit to humans.
The novel virus affecting humans is derived from a North American swine influenza virus that has acquired 
two gene segments (Neuraminidase and Matrix ) from the European swine lineages. This reassortant 
appears to have increased fitness in humans. The potential for increased virulence in humans and of further 
reassortment between the novel H1N1 influenza virus and oseltamivir resistant seasonal H1N1 or with 
highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza stresses the need for urgent
pandemic planning.
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INTRODUCTION
Effective pandemic preparedness and response 
should involve all sectors of government and civil 
society because a pandemic is likely to affect entire 
1,2communities . In less affluent countries, human 
and material resources are often scarce and other 
sectors of government may be called upon to 
maintain essential services. To develop a 
preparedness plan requires engagement of decision 
makers and technical staff from a spectrum of 
offices including Ministries of Health, Agriculture,
Defense, Internal  Affairs, Finance, Labour, 
Transportation, Communications, and Education. 
The initial act is to appoint a pandemic planning 
committee comprised of stakeholders from both 
private and public sectors, with oversight of 
3
ongoing preparedness . The committee's role 
includes assigning technical members to draft 
specific plan segments, setting timelines, 
reviewing policy, and periodically meeting to 
verify progress. The roles of the technical staff are 
to become familiar with the influenza research and 
adapt  internat ional  s tandards to  local  
4realities . 
    
Before drafting a plan, staff should project the 
surge demands a pandemic  might place on health 
care and other infrastructure. Modeling programs 
(e.g. FluAid, FluSurge, and FluWorkLoss free-
5ware) are available to assist in making projections . 
It may be necessary to survey national and local 
infrastructure to determine capacity. Health-seeking 
behaviours are likely different in developing 
countries and the models are meant to provide only 
6
reference points . Once surge requirements have 
been estimated, policy decisions may be needed to 
enhance critical infrastructure. Once a pandemic 
preparedness plan is drafted,the planning 
committee must ensure micro-plans are written and 
operational at sub-national levels.
    
A comprehensive pandemic plan includes: 
objectives and principles; incident management 
structure; surveillance; communication; mitigation 
measures; maintenance of essential services; 
agenda to address gaps in knowledge ; and review, 
6testing and revision of plans .
Objectives and Principles
The plan should identify the preparedness goals 
during each pandemic phase and provide a formal 
risk assessment. Preparedness goals may include 
slowing the spread of the virus, decreasing 
morbidity and mortality, and maintaining essential 
services during the pandemic phase. General 
principles of preparedness, such as equity, 
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Defined lines of authority are essential to 
coordinate a multi-sector response. This section 
should describe the duties of all members of the 
incident management structure and their leader. 
Laws should address the authorization of the 
formation of a planning committee and member's 
authority to declare an emergency, restrict travel 
and mass gatherings, close schools and businesses, 
3,7isolate or quarantine . 
Surveillance:
Surveillance is critical for early detection of a 
pandemic and to monitor its progress. National 
influenza surveillance, community-based 
surveillance, event-based surveillance and rumour 
reporting including reporting, laboratory testing, 
and case definitions, should be described. Plans 
should detail necessary improvements to build 
integrated epidemiology and laboratory 
3,8capacity .  
Plans should detail triggers for shifting from 
routine surveillance to pandemic phase 
surveillance.     
As a pandemic begins, surveillance objectives 
include monitoring the geographic spread of the 
disease, impact on infrastructure (e.g hospital bed 
occupancy), and morbidity and mortality in distinct 
populations. 
Risk Communication:
Communication goals, strategies, and messages 
will evolve during a pandemic. This section should 
discuss communicating disease prevention 
measures to the public; case reporting and 
treatment guidelines to providers; surveillance 
findings to decision makers; and the information on 
new strains to international agencies during 
3,7different pandemic phases .  Plans should 
anticipate the frequency, mechanism, and format of 
risk communications with media. Guidance for 
minimizing transmission in special settings (e.g 
schools, residential institutions, workplaces, and 
public transportation) and messages for families 
caring for sick persons are needed. 
Mitigation Measure :
Implementation of mitigation measures during 
each phase of a swine pandemic is critical. These 
include management of individual cases during 
clusters of novel swine influenza, potential 
containment operations, and mitigating disease 
3,7during the pandemic .
a) Case Management:
This involves recommendations for management of 
suspected novel influenza cases and contacts 
including infection control measures, isolation, and 
3,8
treatment of cases . Guidelines for the duration and 
method of monitoring contacts, indications for 
quarantine, and antiviral prophylaxis are needed. 
Plans should discuss the role of voluntary or 
involuntary isolation of cases and quarantine of 
contacts, implementation thresholds, and of 
enforcement agency responsible. Detailed infection 
control measures to encourage respiratory and hand 
hygiene and whether to recommend and provide 
9masks to the general public should be considered . 
This sub-section should also include guidance for 
infection control in non-medical settings with a 
greater risk of person-to-person transmission (e.g 
dormitories, military barracks, prisons, and 
psychiatric residential facilities).
b) Community Mitigation Activities:
This sub-section is critical for countries in resource-
poor settings. For plans that address school 
closures/dismissals, limited public gatherings, 
changes to public transportation to reduce 
crowding, and other strategies for increasing social 
distancing, the following components should be 
included:
i. Specifications of the agency responsible; the 
role of law enforcement and the military; and 
which threshold criteria will be used (e.g 
when>10% of children at school have 
influenza symptoms);
ii. Methods for communicating decisions to 
responsible agencies and the public;
iii. Measures  to  min imize  un in tended  
consequences (e.g impact on workforce if 
parents stay at home to care for children);
iv. Monitoring the effectiveness and duration of 
mitigation measures (e.g 14 day school 
2,9closure .
c) Pharmaceutical Interventions:
Plans should reflect the results of assessments on 
antiviral and antibiotic manufacturing and 
purchasing; plans should detail the use of limited 
pharmaceuticals and which groups will be 
9
prioritized for treatment or prophylaxis . Plans 
should cite the justification for the prioritization 
scheme and describe how pharmaceuticals will be 
securely stored, distributed (e.g cold chain), 
administered, and tracked.
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Maintenance of Essential Services:
A severe pandemic may disrupt essential services 
including power, water, sanitation, commerce, and 
healthcare. This section of the plan should discuss 
mechanisms for ensuring the continuity of key 
9,10sectors of the economy as a pandemic evolves.  
Sector-specific micro-plans should identify critical 
activities; which can be reduced, which can be 
d e l a y e d / p o s t p o n e d ;  w h i c h  c a n  b e  
moved/transferred; which staff/functions are 
essential and how to cross-train back-up personnel; 
the reliance on backup systems and how they are 
tested. Assessments of the current mortuary 
systems and plans to enhance capacity to handle, 
10store, and track corpses are important.  
Review, Testing and Revision of Plans:
Many pandemic plans lack calculations of demand 
during the pandemic, protocols to meet surge 
capacity, details of non-pharmaceutical 
11intervention, or operational details.  To avoid gaps 
in planning, committees can use tools like the 
United States Health and Human Services 
Inventory for Pandemic Preparedness or the WHO 
Checklist to assess their preparedness. National 
committees should test preparedness using desktop 
exercises, drills, and simulations to identify gaps. 
Plans should specify the timeframe and responsible 
parties tasked to regularly revise the plan to address 
11gaps or changing circumstances.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Establishment and adequate funding of swine 
influenza control units by government and non-
governmental organizations.
2. Review, testing and revision of swine influenza 
pandemic preparedness plan by relevant 
agencies.
3. Incorporation of preventive and control 
measures for influenza in educational 
curriculum.
CONCLUSION
Cases of swine influenza in humans, combined 
with seroepidemiological studies demonstrating 
increased risk of swine influenza in occupationally 
exposed workers, highlight the crucial role that this 
group `play in the development of new strains of 
influenza virus. Persons who work with swine 
should be considered for sentinel influenza 
surveillance and may be an important group to 
include in pandemic planning. Successful planning 
requires active involvement of all levels and 
sectors of government and thorough, periodic, and 
independent plan review, adoption of the latest 
paradigm in pandemic preparedness.
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